



ANDROID DEVELOPMENT #7

@brmlab

NDK

- C / C++

- Interfaces to Java classes definition

- JNI to integrate with Java application

- OpenGL C++

NDK PURPOSE

- Not suitable for every app development
- Not necessarily faster than Java (relative)
- 2D / 3D game engines
- Pre-implemented algorithms
- 3RD party (media codecs, crypto, opencv)

ANDROID GAME ENGINES

- Cocos2D-X

- OGRE

- PowerVR

- Marmalade

- AndEngine

- LINDERDAUM

APPS USING NDK ONLY?

● YES (with limits)

JNI

- Java Native Interface
- Not only “Android thing”
- Bi-Directional API
- Javac for SDK, GCC/G++ for NDK

JNI USAGE

- [Java] `System.loadLibrary(String)`
- [Java] keyword “native”
- `native {type} functionName({args})`
- eg. `native String getUname();`
- [C/C++] `jclass, jstring, jobject, jint`
- [C/C++] `JNIEnv, JavaVM`

NDK DEBUGGING

- Same debug process as with SDK
- Breakpoints, Expressions, Stacktraces
- Separated from SDK
 - separately raised exceptions and debugging
 - can't trace in hybrid java/native complex

NDK PERMISSIONS

- No special NDK permissions


- Permissions inherited from `AndroidManifest.xml`

NDK SECURITY

- Kernel-level sandboxing
- Java VM Zygote - Single control process
- More vulnerable than SDK (app->system)
- Most ROM cracked through NDK/JNI


ANDROID SECURITY






- Application Sandboxing
- Process runtime separation (POSIX)
- Applications are given unique UID and GID
- Zygote controls resources/libraries usage
- APK is signed (SSL manner)
- Application permissions



APPLICATION PERMISSIONS

- Enforced on Framework level
- Cannot be changed on runtime
- Both Hardware and Software permissions
- Application can create new permissions



C, C++, Native Code	Java
 = Linux Kernel	 = Android Frameworks
 = Libraries	 = Applications
 = Android Runtime	

PERMISSIONS PROTECTION

On application defined permissions

protectionLevel

0 - normal - no special confirmation

1 - dangerous - may require confirm.

2 - signature - required signature match

3 - signatureOrSystem - special

DEVICE ADMINISTRATION

- Special type of permission
- Antivirus apps (ESET, Lookout)
- Lock, Wipe, Password (renewal, change, expire,...)
- Disable camera, Encrypt storage,
- Requires standalone confirmation
- since API 9

ANDROID VULNERABILITY

- SharedPreferences are plain XML
- SQLite databases are plain .sqlite files
- Java is easily decompilable (JD)
- Android DEX is too (Dex2JAR, dedexer)
- strings, layouts, drawables are plain xml/bitmap
- MITM predisposition

SECURING APPLICATIONS

- ProGuard (obfuscating code)
- In-App-Billing security (LVL)
- OAuth (OpenID, Google APIs)
- Including SSL certificates in app bundle (not relying on system provided ones)

SECURING SOLUTION

Secure your API

- API is not hidden from attackers

- Secure sensitive data in databases and storages (asymmetric crypto is your friend)

- You cannot just include key-pair

- You cannot hide passwords in code

JAVA HEAP

- Applications are given memory limit
- Differs by device, api level and hw params
 - typically between 16 and 32 MB
 - tablet PCs and high-ends have more
- Exceeding leads to `OutOfMemoryError`
- Beware of (bad) working with bitmaps

MEMORY LEAKS

- Garbage Collector is not a solution

- Context memory leaks

- Objects are assigned context but not cleaned up

- Beware of static class member

- Beware of attaching to application context

INDICATION

D/dalvikvm(1325): GC_CONCURRENT freed 1971K,
18% free 12382K/14983K, paused 3ms+7ms

Heap statistics

Reason for garbage
collection:

- GC_CONCURRENT
- GC_FOR_MALLOC
- GC_EXTERNAL_ALLOC
- GC_HPROF_DUMP_HEAP
- GC_EXPLICIT

LEAK DESTRUCTION

- dump HPROF

- Heap Allocation Profile


- Eclipse MAT

- Memory Analyzer Tool

▼ Details

Size: **509,3 MB** Classes: **7,1k** Objects: **19,1m** Class Loader: **138**

▼ Biggest Objects by Retained Size



Remainder

▼ Actions

- [Histogram](#): Lists number of instances per class
- [Dominator Tree](#): List the **biggest objects** and what they keep alive.
- [Top Consumers](#): Print the most **expensive objects** grouped by class and by package.
- [Duplicate Classes](#): Detect classes loaded by multiple class loaders.

▼ Reports

- [Leak Suspects](#): includes leak suspects and a system overview
- [Top Components](#): list reports for components bigger than 1 percent of the total heap.

▼ Step By Step

- [Component Report](#): Analyze objects which belong to a **common root package** or **class loader**.